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1. Introduction 
Twentieth century analytical epistemology concerned itself 
mainly with various attempts to work out two basic issues. 
The issue most often engaged was the relationship 
between beliefs, propositions, theories and such other 
elements of a world view that had been thought of as 
deserving of being called ‘knowledge’. The other issue that 
was often considered was the relationship between the 
abovementioned elements and experiences. This issue 
was of manifest significance given the empiricist roots of 
most of the analytic tradition and became even more vital 
once Quine’s critique seemed to rule out a priori knowl-
edge and gave rise to the naturalist tradition (Quine 1953). 
The middle of the century didn’t just witness Quine’s 
undermining of the a priori. At much the same time, Sellars 
attacked the idea of The Given and seemed to remove the 
possibility of experience being involved in the justification 
of our beliefs (Sellars 1963). The two arguments taken 
together have given rise to a number of epistemologically 
nihilist positions – most clearly to Rorty’s anti-realist neo-
pragmatism (Rorty 1979). 
Writing in the Peircean pragmatist tradition, Susan 
Haack, in Evidence and Inquiry, has attempted to defend 
what she terms ‘experientialism’. This is the view: 
1. that knowing subjects have (sensory, memorial, etc.) 
experiences, 
2. that unless they had such experiences none of their 
empirical beliefs would be justified to any degree 
and, 
3. that the justification of all of a subject’s justified 
empirical beliefs depends ultimately at least in part 
on those experiences. (Haack 1993, 50-51) 
Haack’s approach is to argue for a double aspect theory of 
justification in which the logical or evaluative aspect of 
justification is supplemented by a causal aspect. By 
turning to the causal relationship between experiences and 
belief states she hopes to avoid Sellars’ objection while 
showing how experiences can play a role in the justifica-
tion of beliefs. 
Double aspect theories, however, are notoriously 
susceptible to ‘deviant causal chains’ objections. This, 
certainly, is the case with Haack’s theory. The possibility of 
deviant causal chains shows up what is the essential 
mismatch between the normative nature of justification and 
the purely descriptive nature of causation. 
Interestingly, however, the failure of Haack’s double 
aspect experientialism does not drive us back towards the 
kind of purely doxastic theories like that put forward by 
Davidson (Davidson 1972-73, 5-20) and criticised by 
Haack. Instead, what becomes glaringly obvious is the 
significance of the problematic assumption which lies at 
the core of Sellars’ argument – the assumption that 
justification is purely logical in character. Haack’s error is 
that she fails to go far enough in her criticism of Sellars. 
Not only should we reject his assumption that justification 
is purely logical but we must allow for a normative aspect 
of justification which isn’t logical in nature. 
The challenge, therefore, must be to provide a normative 
characterisation of justification which isn’t only based upon 
logical relations. 
2. Sellars’ argument against The Given 
In his classic attack upon what he calls ‘The Myth of the 
Given’, Sellars argues that C. I. Lewis or anyone else who 
puts forward what Haack would call an experientialist 
theory faces a dilemma. Either: 
a) It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not 
knowing. The existence of sense data does not logically 
imply the existence of knowledge, 
or 
b) Sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than 
particulars which are sensed. (Sellars 1963, 129) 
Sellars argues each of these alternatives is unacceptable. 
In the first alternative, the claim leaves experiences 
incapable of justifying beliefs. All that they can do is cause 
beliefs. In the second alternative, Sellars argues that the 
account is unacceptable since we do sense particulars and 
not facts. In other words, experiences are events and to 
have experiences is not to have knowledge. It is only 
beliefs (in Sellars’ formulation ‘facts’) that somehow 
constitute knowledge and that can justify other beliefs. 
Haack points out, however, that Sellars’ argument is 
based on an assumption. The assumption is that justifica-
tion is a matter of logical relations. Given that knowledge is 
generally thought to require justification, and logical 
relations apparently can not obtain between beliefs and 
experiences, it follows that experiences can not justify our 
beliefs. 
Without this assumption the argument isn’t justified. If 
we do not assume that all justification is a matter of logical 
relations we are left without the main reason for thinking 
that experiences can only cause – and not justify – beliefs. 
3. Haack’s position 
Susan Haack’s approach is to deny Sellars’ assumption 
and to argue that justification has two aspects. It has the 
logical aspect that Sellars recognised but, also, it pos-
sesses a causal aspect which gives Haack a way for 
experiences to justify beliefs. Haack’s double aspect 
theory of justification consists in providing “an account of 
how [causation] is relevant, of the relations between the 
causal and the logical aspects of the concept of justifica-
tion.” (Haack 1993, 29) 
Without going into Haack’s account in detail it is possible 
to see that it faces two fundamental, and closely related, 
problems. The first of these is that, having pointed out 
Sellars false assumption she falls for one, herself. Just 
because justification is not just a matter of logical relations 
does not automatically mean that it is a matter of logical 
relations and causal relations. 
The second problem is the problem of deviant causal 
chains that troubles double aspect theories in general. In 
Haack’s case the problem affects her claim that “how 
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justified A is in believing that p depends in some fashion 
on what it is that causes him to have that [belief state].” 
(Haack 1993, 75) She argues that belief contents are 
justified in part by their respective belief states being 
caused by perceptual states. A possibility she does not 
consider is that the perceptual states might cause the 
belief states in a non-kosher way. For example, an error in 
our neural pathways might mean that the belief state of 
thinking we are in the company of a cat might be caused 
by the smell of jasmine. Or, to consider an even more 
inconvenient case, all smells, including that of a cat, might 
cause the ‘cat is near’ belief state. 
It might seem that Haack can bite the bullet and say that 
such deviant chains are still cases of justification; cases in 
which we are justified in believing something but, unfortu-
nately, turn out to be wrong. Such a response sits well with 
Haack’s overall strategy of relating justification to the 
evidence available to us rather than to extrinsic considera-
tions. However, the attractiveness of this response actually 
relies upon a hidden equivocation. Haack sees herself as 
presenting an evidentialist account of justification “in the 
sense that the account of justification proposed is couched 
in terms of the subject’s evidence for a belief.” (Haack 
1993, 139) However, this suggests that, if perceptual 
states are not evidence for beliefs then, while deviant 
chains aren’t a problem, causation is not an aspect of 
justification. On the other hand, if perceptual states are 
evidence for beliefs then causation is an aspect of 
justification but the degree to which perceptual states are 
evidence for beliefs can be evaluated. Since she does 
want to consider causation to be an aspect of justification 
Haack has to reject deviant chains and give an account of 
kosher ones. As we will see, however, a normative 
account of this sort leads Haack away from a double 
aspect theory of justification. 
At a point in her presentation of double aspect experien-
tialism Haack stops talking about the logical aspect of 
justification and starts to talk about an evaluative aspect. 
Her reason for this is that she later comes to examine 
Popper’s and Watkins’ deductivist account of the role of 
evidence and to reject it. In its place Haack argues for 
what she calls a moderate psychologism, “according to 
which psychological factors do not exhaust, but have 
contributory relevance to, questions of justification/rational 
acceptability.” (Haack 1993, 103) While her attack on 
deductivism is on target, she fails to properly integrate the 
conclusion into her account. The original need for a double 
aspect theory was caused by the limited ability of logic to 
justify our knowledge. Having replaced the logical aspect 
of justification with a more broadly evaluative one this 
rationale disappears. Logic can not take into account 
events but there is no reason why evaluation can’t. There 
aren’t even grounds to revivify the logical/causal distinction 
in terms of normative and descriptive aspects of justifica-
tion. As we have seen, if causation is to play a role in 
justification it will have to be ‘the right sort’ of causation, 
thus giving it a normative quality, as well. It turns out that 
rather than two aspects, justification has only one – 
evaluative. 
What role is left for logic in justification? Haack thinks 
(Haack 1993, 105) that valid deductive derivations do 
constitute reasons for accepting statements, just not the 
only ones. However, even this claim ought to be under-
stood in the context of what is essentially a psychological 
picture of justification. Once we opt for an epistemology 
with a knowing subject the role of logical arguments must 
be understood within the broader evaluative context. 
Harman illustrates this point when he shows that there 
exist no deductive psychological inferences (Harman 
1986). Thus, for example, Mary – who believes that there 
are corn flakes in the cupboard, that she will see them 
when she opens it and that she has opened it – doesn’t 
automatically believe she is seeing corn flakes even 
though her other beliefs imply this. In fact, realising that 
she can’t see any corn flakes she reaches the reasonable 
conclusion that someone else has eaten them. Experi-
ences and beliefs interact in various ways to justify other 
beliefs. Logic helps us to relate different beliefs but doesn’t 
tell us what to do once we know how they are related. To 
understand what we should do we would have to look at a 
broader account of evaluation. This means that, rather 
than accepting moderate psychologism we ought to go for 
the full-blooded version in which the logical connections 
between beliefs play a role by influencing psychological 
inferences rather than constituting reasons, themselves. 
4. Normative naturalism 
Not much remains of Sellars’ original argument against 
The Given. The accounts of experience which took it for 
granted – such as those of Davidson, Popper and Watkins 
– have turned out to be inadequate. In fact, they could well 
be deemed to be a reductio of Sellars’ position. 
We have seen that the argument rested upon the false 
assumption that justification is logical in character. It has 
turned out that justification is primarily psychological in 
character. Given this, there appears to be no good reason 
why experience can not have a role in justifying beliefs – 
which is as empiricists would expect. What is the character 
of experience, however? 
Haack argues (Haack 1993, 108-117) that experiences 
are experiences of objects rather than of sense data. She 
means this in the sense that, when we look, what we are 
aware of are objects and not sense data. In arguing in this 
way, however she is still holding on to assumptions which 
are an artefact of accepting Sellars’ argument. In particu-
lar, she is showing a preference for conscious inferences 
over the unconscious processing that is done on the 
information which reaches our senses. Such a preference 
was natural if what we were concerned with was logic. 
However, given the profoundly naturalist view of justifica-
tion which has resulted from a rejection of Sellars, there is 
no reason for such a valuation. The Given, far from being 
a myth, ought to be reconsidered as a possibly viable 
element of a naturalist account of experience. 
From what has been said it might seem that any norma-
tive notion of justification might have to be given up. This 
isn’t the conclusion that Haack reaches; nor is it one that I 
would see as justified. Frege railed against psychological 
justifications of mathematics and logic (Frege 1980). In a 
sense, much the same error has been made by his 
followers when they insist that psychological inferences 
must be related to logic to be justified. The problems 
caused by Sellars’ account are symptomatic of this error. 
Giving up on normativity because of taking up a psycho-
logically based view of justification would be another 
example of it. As it is, the existence of deviant chains 
forces us to conclude that we must work out an account of 
the relationship between experiences and beliefs which is 
normative. 
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